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The African Experience
By Ng'weno

Osolo-Nasubo

Political development in Africa has gone
through various stages in different states
during the last two decades. Often this
development entailed high hopes as well
as disappointments. And as the new leaders of Africa embarked on the search for
a political system ideally suited to transform the socio-economic and post-colonial political ills facing their citizens, a
wave of "isms" spread across the continent. Concepts such as "African Socialism," "Nkrumahism" and "Pragmatic Socialism" were expounded to politicallyunsophisticated citizens whose total
loyalty to these concepts was demanded.
Along with this emerged the concept of
one-party versus muIti-party system,wh ich
the colonialists had created and promoted
on the eve of independence to insure
"Parliamentary Democracy."
To some non-African watchers (notably
Western Europeans), African traditional
communalism, to which the African leaders constantly referred in their search for
a new socio-economic and pol itical order,
became equated with Eastern European
communism.
Meanwhile, African governments, preoccupied with socio-economic problems
facing their people, sought assistance
from extemal govemments and multinational corporations. While big powers
sought to fight their ideological battles on
the African continent, the Africans soon
discovered how they might take advantage of both sides. But some nations were
hurt in the process, both politically and
economically.
The Beginning

To dwell on the origin of African political
development, such a study would compel
one to take intellectual and mental flight
back to the pre-slave and pre-colonial
epochs, when Africa had politically organized itself and had created great kingdoms and empires (e.g. Ghana, Kush,
Mali, Songhai, Soudan, Zimbabwe).
ILLUSTRATION BY KOFI TYUS

y, more than ever, the world is
- ed with both realism and contras: A world of "have-less" exceed_ . outnumbering the "have-plenty," a
~ of strong political and economic
and development known as "su-=:..-.nlAlers,"and another world known by
such as: primitive, undeveloped,
eveloped, developing, Third World.
last entities do not as yet fit or qualthe definition of the common word
r" -let alone "super-power." There
ite world, and a non-white world; a
of the few super-rich (pol itically and
:::::n>lmically) controlling the destinies of
erging nations of the world.
where is this realism more seriously
nced than in Africa (although one
comparable problems in Asia and
America). The African situation is
more complex and precarious than
-= :Jihers primarily due to the continent's
sand disjointed historicity; and the
of her resources by centuries of slave
"" and the emergence of colonial hey and imperialism.
en Africans realized (during colonial
-00) that they were socially, politically
=. economically impoverished and were
oolitically free, they sought to achieve
ical freedom as a prelude to all other
oms. But the search for a cohesive
faced insurmountable difficulties
were predicated upon the vertical
- . ion of the ethnic population, and the
ion of unviable colonial enclaves;
also, due to the compounded abof political education among the
~ rity of the African population.
evertheless, when a few Africans took
-- charge to organize the masses, the
:=-Drresponded enthusiastically because
e colonial pressure on the one hand
the envisaged unity promising them
ange from that pressure on the other.
in a very short time, Africans rallied
placed the colonial governments in
=. state' of siege. Apparently, when the
nial authorities in the Metropolitan
ernments learned what the Africans
e up to, they quickly suggested "a ne-

gotiated settlement." But little did the
African participants at independence conferences know that the colonialists had
indeed already worked out a politico-economic formula advantageous only to
themselves. Therefore, when the independence instruments were ceremoniously handed, the Africans got only a bare
bone, while the flesh and marrow had
been retained by the ex-colonialists.
Economic dominance and pursuit for
wider markets for finished (manufactured)
goods brought about both economic and
pol itical imperial ism- thus prompting
slavery, colonialism and now neo-colonialism. Further, politics has always been
applied either as a weapon or as a ladder
with which to achieve an economic goal;
once that goal is achieved, politics is
again used as a shield with which to protect the achieved economic objective.
Independence Constitutions:
"Parliamentary Democracy"Governments without Power
In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau defines political power as "the psychological control over the minds of men."
In the case of Africa, this control was firmly
entrenched in the independence constitutions of the new nations.
Constitutions that were drafted by colonial powers as a pre-condition for poIitical freedom became the framework for
independence. For example, the constitutions provided for a colonial minority
representation and rigid requirements for
amendments-aimed at protecting expatriates from "expropriation of their property." Taken together, these constitutions
thus firmly closed the channels that the
African majority governments might have
used to introduce massive economic priorities, including land reform and ownership. For example, the constitutions of
Kenya and Nigeria, and the presently proposed constitution for Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), state categorically that:
The Constitution will contain provisions
("the Bill of Rights") on the lines of those
in the Constitutions of other recently in-

dependent
Commonwealth
countries,
protecting
fundamental human rights
and freedoms ... this will confer protection from expropriation of property except on specified grounds of public interest and even then only on condition
that there is prompt payment of adequate compensation and that the whole
compensation may be remitted abroad
free from any deduction, charge or tax
made or levied in respect of its remission.

The "Bill of Rights" provision forbidding
expropriation of property that was undemocratically acquired during colonial rule,
particularly land, guarantees the continuation of the unequal distribution of wealth
between the African majority arid the European minority. It sustains the development
of the European sector, while continuing
to hinder the development of the Africans
on a large scale. More than that, the "Bill
of Rights" provision allowing the remission of cash compensation abroad without
restrictions or tax is indeed an example
of how African governments are burdened
with a critical lack of foreign exchange.
This lack of foreign exchange continues
to plague many governments into pol itical
instability.
Jacob Oser, in his book, Promoting Economic Deve/opmentWith Illustrations
from Kenya, writes about a related constitutional clause to compensate expatriate
civil servants in Kenya who wished to temporarily leave government service:
When Africans took over from the Europeans, the question of what to do about
the foreign civil servants arose. The new
regime wanted most of them to stay on,
but many were not inclined to do so.
Both the few who were dismissed and
the many who wanted to leave were offered compensation ... so attractive that
most European civil servants, even if
they had wanted to remain in Kenya and
work for the new regime, quit their jobs,
took their termination pay, and immediately accepted other government positions-Ail
these payments were and
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are of course, convertible into sterling
in London. No wonder this is called in
Kenya the 'golden handshake', a sweet
way to be bid adieu.
The retention of former colonial civil
servants (both European expatriates and
local bureaucrats) by governments in the
developing nations of Africa has contributed tremendously to the socia-political
and economic instability in Africa. Although most of the expatriates are not primari Iy pol itical opportun ists, nevertheless,
they are economically
inclined. They all
cap ita Iize on the fri nge expe rience ga ined
during the colonial period to further their
socio-economic
ambitions. They are not
too keen about changing the direction of
their countries' socio-economic
transformation that would encompass most or all
the people. They "are committed to capitalism because of their background, their
Western education, and their shared experience and enjoyment of positions of
privilege. They are mesmerised by capitalist institutions and organizations. They
ape the way of life of their old colonial
masters, and are determined to preserve
the status and power inherited from them,"
wrote Kwame Nkrumah in Class Struggle

It did not escape my notice that where
the administrative service was concerned, if a policy was laid down for the
officials by the Government with which
they disagreed, means were adopted,
by subterfuge or otherwise, to wreck that
policy-It happened too often for it to
be a coincidence that whenever government policy was to be put into effect,
the officials either dilly-dallied or saw
that nothing was done about it.
The same thesis is reiterated by Jack
Woddis in Introduction to Neo-Coloni-

alism:
There may be some former colonial officials who sincerely wish to assist the
new states, but the majority of them,
whatever may be their views, are willynilly part of the imperialist establishment which trained them, moulded their
outlook and continues to retain them
precisely because they are still able to
render a service.
Rapid Development
Gradual Approach

Approach Versus

The attainment of political independence
in Africa was viewed
by the African
masses
as
a
prelude
to
the
struggle ultiin Africa.
mately aimed at the eradication of the
Most of the expatriates were colonial
social and economic ills left behind by
diehards, conservative farmers and busithe former empire-builders.
The masses
nessmen
sympathetic
to colonialism.
yearned for quick solutions to multitude
Moreover,
more
complications
were
of problems emanating, for the most part,
added to this episode when African govfrom the lack of proper education, abments entrusted these people with exsence of infrastructural
faci Iities, nutritremely significant
responsibilities.
For tional food, housing, clothing, employexample, a few of them became senior
ment, equal treatment and, above all, the
advisors and executives in matters involvreturn and redistribution of land.
ing politico-economic
policy. In Kenya, for
Nearly all African political leaders uninstance, former spokesmen of the diederstood these basic needs. However, the
hard European settlers were appointed to
manner in which to achieve them preParliament-some
into President Jomo
sented the hardest obstac Ie; for it was not
Kenyatta's cabinet - and as senior judges.
until a little while later that they realized
But more often than not, they were unwi 11- the above needs or fruits of independence
ing to give unqualified support to the Africould not be easily achieved because of
can govemments they served. Nkrumah,
colonial contradictions
and, if one may
in Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame add, thesocio-economic
and political
Nkrumah, recounts how his government
ideologies of colonizers, versus African
nationalism.
experienced similar problems:

a

Education: as Colonizers'
Ideological Weapon
Education in Africa during colonialperi
was influenced by the spirit of racial d·
crimination, just as all other aspects
colonial life. Whereas all children of
ruling settler group had cornprehensi :=
and well-developed
educational facitities
and proper curricula, the African childrer
were simply looked upon and laughed a;
-as though they were "Charlie Brown
cartoons. In other words, Africans werE
depicted as educational sub-normals.
All European children were providec
with professional kind of education ano
enough funds duly allocated for that purpose, but the Africans were required ~
pay "school fees." Also, they were subjected to rudimentary and irrelevant kinds
of education that did not prepare then:
for the task of nation-building,
before ane
even after independence.
For example.
whereas Europeans and other foreigners
(e.g. Asians in East and Central Africa,
were encouraged to study medicine, engineering and business, Africans were
encouraged to memorize foreign religious
beliefs and practices without permissio
to question their meaning and validity.
Young Africans spent more time studying the history and geography
of the
world, especially of Europe and the Americas. This curriculum was saturated with
glorious Western Eu rope under the Popes,
the renaissance and the reformation-undoubtedly with a lot of exaggeration. Africans were led to bel ieve that it was important to memorize William Shakespeare's
plays, know a great deal about the One
Hundred Years' War of the Roses, Oliver
Cromwell,
Napoleon
Bonaparte, Alexander "the Great," Captain James Cook,
the Battle of Waterloo, the United States
and the French Wars of independence,
Louis XIV and Louis XVI, Hitler and the
Jews, the War of Jenkin's Ear, and most
preposterously, King Leopold of Belgium
as the divine owner of the Congo.
Nothing of substance was mentioned
about the Great African kingdoms, and

the Europeans' involvement in the slave
trade, except to glorify Europeans as the
pioneers who struggled and brought the
slave trade to an end. Africans were further led to believe that the Europeans
were superior, and their culture and continent represented the earthly heaven.
Thus, the Europeans were mandated by
the Creator to "colonize" and "civilize"
the "primitive" non-white races. In this respect, the African was totally mis-educated, and this process contributed to his
belief in his own inferiority; and later to
his political instability.
In French and Portuguese colonies, assimilation (assimilado) became the basis
of education. The curriculum emphasized
the acceptance of European culture as
the basis of the "civilized" life, and the rejection or forsaking of African culture,
which formed the basis for the "primitive"
life.
Another devastating obstacle to Africans' educational advancement was the
result of colonial governments' policy of
systematic elimination of young Africans
from school at the early or primary stage.
Under this policy, called "superannuation," which did not apply to Europeans
and other foreign students, indiscriminate
turnovers became the order of the educational system.
("Superannuation," a policy aimed at
ensuring Europeans and other non-Africans of abundant and unlirnited semiskilled labor, was recommended to the
colonial government of Kenya by the
Archbishop of East arid Central Africa,
The Rt. Rev. Leonard J. Beecher. It stated
that in the event an African pupil failed in
European language(s) (i.e. English or
French), the student in question would
automatically be withdrawn from school
regardless of the results or perfomiance
in other courses. Under this policy, repetition in either course or examination was
outlawed. This policy later spread
throughout colonial Africa. As a result, the
youngsters thus affected by this pol icy
ended up auctioning their labor power on
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European farms and/or factories gatheringraw materials for export; others labored in non-African [e.g. Asian, Arab]
commercial stores doing domestic work,
and other back-breaking jobs while others
enlisted in the colonial army, police and
prisons. And those who did not find work
ended up in untold misery. For further details, see N. Osolo-Nasubo, A Socio-Economic Study of the Kenya Highlands, from
1900-1970: A Case Study of the Uhuru
Government. Chapter 111, pp. 64-112.)
Along with this, was the stigma attached
to manual work. Agriculture and other
manual occupations were viewed as careers of the "unintelligent" or "stupid"
people. This stigma was re-enforced particu larly by the punishment often imposed
on an African student for whatever reason
or mistake committed by the student (e.g.
arriving late for class, failing given tests,
or appearing in rags). The punishment so
imposed was, more often than not, related
to performing some work in the field: such
as cultivating or cutting grass. Psychologically, therefore, African youths grew
up despising rural life, and every youth
struggled to the utmost to pass the numerous examinations prepared in the
Metropole so that he wou Id eventually migrate to urban centers in search of rudimentary socia-economic salvation.
Despite this limited education, one basic advantage the system had was its emphasis on liberal education as opposed
to technical and/or science education.
This system was tailored upon the principle of comprehensive essay type of examinations, which fortunately prepared
young Africans· to think and reason comprehensively. Simi larly, the encouragement of Africans to study law extolled their
thinking and reasoning process. A few
African students went abroad, and while
there, new ideas and philosophies developed and crystallized. This was later expressed in speeches and writings-most
of which were intended to put in proper
perspective the African history and tradition, the repudiation of colonialism, and

call for self-determination and independence.
Upon independence, the new African
leaders realized that in order to forge
ahead socially and economically, a policy
designed to combat illiteracy must be elevated highest on the order of priorities.
Many states resolved to broaden educational facilities by offering free education.
Although this was received somewhat
positively, nonetheless, some leaders
have made rather more serious mistakes
than the colonialists. In Kenya, for instance, private school fees have skyrocketted since independence, especially in
the former European schools. As a result,
only the children of politicians and
wealthy businessmen are able to afford
the cost. Coupled with this blunder is the
policy of offering free education at the
university level. In essence, it is Iike trying
to buiId a house starting with the roof
while neglecting the foundation.
The Search for Rapid Socio-Economic
and Political Development (ISMS)

Compounded with ever rising frustrations
among the masses, African political leaders resolved that political slogans used
during the struggle for independence had
already served their purpose. They had to
be catalogued and kept in the archives,
and serious considerations given to the
provision of social amenities. To some
African leaders, the problem was not
merely confined to district, national or regional level; it was seen as too compounded and too formidable to be tackled
singly or in isolation. Therefore, first the
struggle was to be linked to the issues of
identity and the crisis of economic development.
The search for a scientific system or approach that would offer rapid solution to
the compounded socia-economic and political ills in Africa soon became the
ideological battleground, chiefly between
Western capitalist adherents (both local
and abroad) on the one hand, and Eastern socialist admirers on the other.

To most Africans, Europe was associated with slavery and colonialism. It WaE
a period of desperate search for an alternative system that would offer a stronc
hand in regaining the traditional Afric~
communal life and personality, guardec.
with the managing of the means of production and distribution of resources.Wi'
this spirit, most African leaders preferroo
the socialist approach-for it derives from
the communalism and humanism of traditional Africa. This system was given
several names by several leaders, for
example: "African Socialism," by Jomo
Kenyatta; "Ujamma," by Julius Nyerere;
"Nkrumahism,"
by Kwame Nkrumah;
"Communaucracy," bySekou Toure; "Negritude," by Leopold Senghor; "L'homme
personnaliste," by Mamadou Dia.
Nyerere, in Ujamma: Essays on Socialism, asserted that:
'Ujamaa,' then, or 'Familyhood,' describes our socialism. It is opposed to
capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man - Modern African
socialism can draw from its traditional
heritage the recognition of 'society' as.
an extension of the basic family unit.
Nkrumah, one of the great theorists and
an eloquent philosopher on the African
political scene drew great attention to socialism (scientific socialism), and what it
could, if adopted, offer Africa. He reasoned:
Socialism is the only pattern that can
within the shortest possible time bring
the good life to the people. For socialism assumes the public ownership of
the means of production-the land and
its resources-and the use of those
means for production that will bring
benefit to the people. (from African Socialism, by William Friedland and Carl
Rosberg, Jr.).
Capitalism, therefore, became synonymous With slavery, colonialism, elitism
(class and/or social and economic strati-

-

), and neo-colonialism. The rnaof Africans reject capitalism beit breeds individualism (as opo Africa's communal ism orvi Ilageo Africans, individualism breeds
ness, family disintegration, pergreed and, therefore, misery. Capi-=
, hence, is viewed as a threat to the
- - al of African traditional pillars of
_ e.g. the concept of land ownership,
=ed family, method of choosing
and polygyny (or polygamy), rules
- seccession and inheritance.
~ it became difficult to introduce soISITl on a massive scale to take the
of capitalism. This complication
predicated upon many contradicFor one thing, Western capitalists
had invested in colonial Africa
id not withdraw either their capital
nnel at the eve of independence.
colonial governments, along with
leaders and European settlers,
to a constitutional framework that
protection-thus giving the capi-=
a strong hand in the management
means of production and distribu, ~oods and services.
eover, since the colonial authorities
relinquished a "shadow" but retained
-= "substance." it became impossible
~ new African governrnents to change
-elations of Western colonial-capitalist
and its form of production. This
lication was further predicated upon
factual variables alluded to earlier:
-'= the new government's retention of
- colonial civil service, and European
- r personnel of the armed forces; secthe Africans' acceptance of rig id
.:. unworkable constitution during nego- - n for independence.
e battle, therefore, shifted on the ac- ition of capital that would neither be
lIy capitalistic nor communistic (for
latter was said to be associated with
- denial of basic human rights; e.g. race
racism). Again and again, the West
cmmered hard on this question of "basic
an rights" in socialist countries, parlarly the Soviet Union (as though the

=

colonialists themselves were champions
of human equality). African leaders responded to this propaganda chiefly because of colonial experience involving
race and racism. In other words, Africans
could not in any way embrace communism-an ideology also associated with
racism, the gravest menace partly responsible for both slavery and colonialism.
The acquisition and control of capital
investment in Africa has dominated African pol itics since the late 1950s and early
19pOs,when most African states attained
political independence. It has drawn both
the West and the East into a stronger competition for economic superiority all over
the world. Africans, not wanting to be entangled in East-Westcold war politics, resolved to develop their nations from the
neutral position, bearing in mind an old
proverb: "When two bull elephants fight,
it is the grass that suffers most."
Private investment (capitalism) and
public enterprise (socialism) as separate
and distinct political and economic systems continue to dorninate African political and economic development.
But most Africans prefer scientific socialism to capitalism, because the former
offers elements deep-rooted in the African
traditional social structure, which calls for
communal ownership of land and the concept of extended family.
One Party Vs. Multi-Party

Systems

Immediately following independence, the
new African governments realized that
the rhetoric, the quest for unity and support they had sought and received during
the heyday of political struggle for independence from colonial bondage could
no longer be guaranteed unless the ever
rising socio-economic frustrations were
solved once and for all.
The politicians quietly acknowledged
that these frustrations could not be solved,
primarily due to the socio-economic and
political framework they and their excolonial governments and settler-businessmen had agreed to. New slogans

were therefore immediately created as a
means to conceal their embarrassment,
weakness and, above all, their failure to
fulfill the rhetorical promises.
For instance, in Kenya, the old slogan
"Uhuru na Mashamba" (freedom and expropriation of the highlands from the
European settlers) was substituted with
"Uhuru na Kazi" (freedom and work); in
Tanzania, the emphasis shifted from
"Uhutu na Kazi" to "Uhuru na Umoja"
(Freedom and Unity); in Ghana, "Freedom
and Unity" was substituted with "Work
and Happiness," while in Cameroon "Unificacion Imediate" was replaced with
"Paix Travail Patrie" (Peace-Work-Fatherland).
The emphasis, therefore, was on "Unity
and Hard Work"-without which the new
governments could not guarantee their
survival. This became apparent as members of the "opposition" got busy accusing the new governments of political naivete and impotence. The opposition felt
they too had participated in the struggle
for independence and were entitled to an
equal share of the fruits of independence.
This they had been denied by their former colleagues who had, by sheer chance,
been successful in forming the first government. Being furious and angry, the
opposition held nuts and bolts politics
around the country (or countries) telling
the people how the government had lied
to the rnasses by fai Iing to honor pre-independence promises. Fearing possible
negative consequences, most governments reacted by banning the opposition
party (or parties).
Role of the Opposition

Under colonialisrn, the role of an opposition party (or parties) was not quite understood by the Africans who always were at
the fringes of the power structure. Under
British colonial practice, for example, the
government successfully operated on the
prernise of law and order. Senior members
of the opposition party's "shadow cabinet" (who were all Europeans) were in
constant touch with the government-par-
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ticularly on matters involving major policy,
e.g. forced labor, African taxes, racial segregation (in schools, employment, housing, etc.), and appropriation of African
land.
Although some colonialists were in the
opposition, nevertheless, they were always considered part of the colon ial structure. Consequently, they were constantly
kept posted by the sitting governrnent or
administrator of the new policy under
consideration.
The new African governments fai led to
continue with this procedure or practice.
And government policy was kept from the
opposition, except in parliamentary debate over common concerns. Even then,
a lot of shouting and heckling-mostly
by "governments' back-benchers" - prevented logic and/or reason to prevail. It
has even been charged that some
speeches and documents given in African
Parliaments were actually written by foreign "advisors." (For example, the Kenya
Government's "Sessional Paper No. 10:
African Social ism. ")

When the governments were advocating
unity and hard work, some members of the
opposition traded on inter-ethnic animosity ("tribalism") and, also, capitalized
on the governments' lack of proper planning and allocation of resources. More
criticism was directed toward governments' poor performanc,e, coupled with
massive accumulation of land and other
property. Approval to these charges was
echoed by the masses, and the governments became angry. Soon the governments labeled the opposition as "dissident groups" and "enemies."
To make matters worse, some members
of the opposition (at times a majority of
them), misunderstood their role in politics.
Most of them regarded their responsibility
as that of "opposing" whatever policy or
program the government introduced.
Competition, jealousy, and oratory overrode reason and logic.
The rulers, after a long while, charged
that the opposition was not participating

I

search for solutions to the many
is of nation-building. Because the
rs of the opposition in parliament
=-:::.'v.!:.,-l
salaries (from national budget),
ere accused by the ruling group of
~ a "do-nothing" group and an "ex-=--c:::""""
luxury."
opposition was also seen as lackagents for ideological contest and
..••..•..
_.o,"'ion which, with the aid from multi- Icorporations, neo-colonial aswell
- ::::::mmunistpowers and/or their agenId resort to iIleg itimate means for
row of the party legitimately in
eopold Senghor argued in Na----.,W'V'/ and the African Road to Social-

opposition is tempted to place it-

- i, under the pretext of ideology, at
:-e service of the foreigner-the oppo-;;ion parties are teleguided from the
- zside .... :
example, those in power in Africa
Iy cooperate with or consult the op--on on the identification and allocaof national priorities, distribution of
- ies (particularly key ministries).
ant budgetary considerations and
- ocations are planned and carried out
~ small number of self-conceited indi- Is, who pay more attention to the
_;lee from the expatriate "advisors"
knowledge of the continent's needs
priorities- particularly in the rural
~- rs- is very limited.
~ most African states, key ministries-- se, economic planning, attorney
_- eral, state, commerce and industry,
foreiqn affairs-have often been alloto members of the president's ethnic
:: p (Kenya is a case in point) on the
xt of ethnic loyalty. Therefore, certain
ions of the nation are systematically
-x:
edin programs of economic develent. And the citizens in those areas
-obliged to conclude that the country's
= ers do not consider them on the same
-ng with the ethnic group of whom the
- n's president is a member. This treatof subserviency has indeed forced

some ethnic groups to advocate secession or irredentism. For example, the problem of ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia and in
northern Kenya and also that of Eritrea
may have been predicated by this kind of
treatment.
The desire to retain power indefinitely
is certainly a factor in the problems and
constraints of African political development. African presidents and ministers
(especially those in the key ministries),
tend to hold on to their offices for liferegardless of manifest incompetence and
even extremely advanced age. Because
some of these leaders have suffered imprisonment in the hands of colonialists,
they feel the new nation owes them an
ever-lasting political and economic
reward.
The Military and Politics

The colonial governments, seeking to run
the colonies with uninterrupted power
(power at equilibrium), most often selected African men to join the colonial
armed forces, mainly from the most disadvantaged ethnic groups. And although
these people played no significant roles
in decision or policy making during colonial period, they knew that their European
bosses were kept in close touch and consultation by the sitting colonial government. Inotherwords, top men in the armed
forces were regarded as equal partners in
the sharing of colonial authority and the
fruits of colonialism.
On the eve of independence, or soon
after, many of these Africans who for years
had served in the colonial military and police structure expected to be promoted to
"officer" or "inspector" rank (promotion
through experience) by virtue of the fact
that their nation(s) had achieved independence. Further, they also looked forward to the time when they would be consulted by the new African leaders on policies or matters of national security and
importance. However, African governments, still preoccupied with the colonial
psychosis of neglecting those without

formal education, and the false notion of
"white is always right," failed to promote
the African officers soon enough.
After political independence, the African members of the armed forces-excluded from economic participationwatched with frustration and desperation
those at the top of political echelon
abound in wealth, while the incomes of
the armed forces personnel remained
virtually unimproved (bearing in mind that
these people's emoluments orwages were
among the lowest during colonial period).
Consequently, they acted in concert with
some members of opposition party (or
parties), and revolted by overthrowing the
sitting government.
When this move was successfully carried out, a justification was given by the
new forces in power: that the deposed
government, together with the political
machinery had proved unworkable and,
therefore, a change of the existing order
was justified.
It must be noted, however, that military
rulers, especially those who replaced progressive governments, have hindered the
"revolutionary" changes in the neo-colonial economic order. This was the case of
the 1966 coup in Ghana, which deposed
Nkrumah.
Another aspect involves former colonial
governments' directly intervening militarily to put down any form of military takeover of an existing government whose
socio-economic and political direction
and performance meet overwhelming approval of the former colonial power. This
was the case, for example, in Senegal in
1962, Niger in 1963, Gabon, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar in 1964.
The catalyst for mil itary takeover of
power in young African nations can be explained in terms of class struggle in the
new nations, busily searching for (new)
answers to the ever growing socio-economic and political frustrations and impoverishment. This new quest is predicated upon the numerous failures resulting from the old colonial-capitalist path.
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COUpSd'etat in Africa should therefore be
understood as a process through which
young nations are still plagued with complex contradictions and problems of nation-building.
Multi-National Corporations and
International Monetary Agencies

Since economics was the chief cause of
colonialism, the colonies' economy was
thus tied to that of the colonizer countries.
This meant that the colonies' primary responsibilitywas to produce raw materials
for feeding and sustaining the machines
in the Metropole, and to provide markets
for poorly manufactured "treaty" goods.
Rene Dumont observed in False Start in
Africa:
In December of 1949, in northern Congo
(then Belgium), I picked up an alarm
clock I wanted to buy in a little Greek
shop. The proprietor quickly grabbed it
out of my hands, saying: "That's a treaty
article, it only works for a few days." But
it was sold to the Congolese at the same
price as good European clocks."

As a result, the colonies were not industrialized. Industrialization, rather than agriculture, Africans argue, is the only perpendicular road to the eradication of the
socio-economic and political ills accrued
and abandoned by departed colonial governments. This undertaking, however, requires enormous capital investment. Although Africa has the capital resources
(most of it still untapped), it does not as
yet have the means necessary to mobilize
its accumulation and utilization. Consequently, developed nations of both the
East and the West have been approached
by African governments for assistance in
this regard.
While both the East and the West have
responded with some degree of apprehension and sympathy, politics-as
a
concentrated expression of economicshas often dominated the economic intention by the would-be financiers. The multinational corporations of Western Europe
and the United States, aided in part by

ional monetary agencies (e.g. The
- Bank, The International Monetary
gency for International Oevelop10), the United Nations, Chemical
Barclays Bank, Banque de France,
Beige, Oppenheimer's
Anglo
--~-""n
Corporation), have a monopoly
I as the power to exert political and
:::r-...--nomicinfluence over the selection of
ent in Africa.
~
African. politicians are reminded
:.;:;q>aration spokesmen that the ecodevelopment of Africa seems imIe without financial and technologicapital which can only come from
• meaning from the West. Because
sstill produce what they do not
e (chiefly export-oriented raw mas), and consume what they do not
e (import-oriented), they often pay
attention to such advice.
ign capital investment is not only a
of enhancing development, it is
and importantly so) a mode of real_ high rates of profit. As a result, big
-.."ninvestors, before committing themto invest their capital, first prefer to
aranteed by African governments
conditions that will provide such prof- rthermore, assurance involving comtion for loss of future profits is
t in the event of political changes
as nationalization of investment, reess of the amount of capital and the
- - of return at the time.
id Apter and Louis Wolf Goodman,
rs of The Multi-national Corporation
Social Change, noted the following
cteristics usually employed by mul- nal corporations in host countries:
__Corporations have demanded guarees of police action against the fortion of unions or the arrest of princiunion militants as preconditions for
tablishing a plant in a host country ...
-0
opportunity to adjust prices so that
bulk of the product's value accrues
-- er to the host country, the tax haven,
- the country of destination, depending
which is most advantageous to the

-

zoipotetion.

A few years ago, the leading international financing institution (World Bank)
rejected requests for loans from membernations of Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia to
construct the Aswan Dam and the Tanzanian-Zambian Railroad, respectively. In
both instances, the respective governments were advised that the proposed
projects were not economically
viable.
And when these governments turned to
Eastern nations as a last resort, the Western nations were quick to charge that
these governments "had gone red."
It would appear, at times, that the multinational corporations
and international
monetary agencies as peculiarly being
more destructive to the African pol itical
process than are helpful in building and
strengthen ing that process. Equ ipped with
capital and personnel, the foreign enterprises influence African pol itical process
-like
a remote control mechanism-in
pursuit of their own selfish ends.
Given the fact that little, if anything, has
been done by the African governments to
positively respond to the pre-independence promises and expectations, to relieve the poverty and impoverishment of
the overwhelming majority of their underprivileged
peasants in rural areas, and
little could be expected under the ongoing policy of pouring most of the investment and other resources in urban centers,
both civilian and military governments
will continue to experience turn-overs.
Therefore, the future political development in Africa will continue to undergo
this metamorphic
experience
until the
Africans themselves as a whole (or at
least a majority) first undergo mental
decolonization, followed by political and
economic unity through union government
in the same manner that the majority of
Americans and the Soviets saw the logic
of forging their states and republics into
respective unions.
D
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